2001

January 1, 2001: As part of FAA-industry Capstone partnership, FAA began the first use of ADS-B technology to track and service traffic near Bethel, Alaska – an area that had no radar coverage. The new system used ground-based transceivers to pick up transmissions from aircraft equipped with ADS-B. The information was then transmitted via phone line and satellite to the Anchorage Air Route Traffic Control Center, where it was displayed electronically to controllers.

January 17, 2001: FAA and the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) signed an understanding covering operational errors and operational deviations (OE/D). Under this agreement, failures to maintain 80 percent separation minima would be
recorded as technical violations and maintained in the employee's training folder. FAA and NATCA would, however, immediately cancel the revocation or suspension of control tower operator licenses and facility ratings in addressing performance deficiencies. After twelve months, any information which could lead to the identification of an employee – whether causal or contributory to a technical violation – would be discarded. No controller would be decertified or forced to complete remedial training for a technical
violation, and all controllers would have to attend refresher training annually. The agreement, which would be reviewed at six-month intervals, also called for quarterly meetings at the national level to address quality assurance. In addition, FAA and NATCA agreed to work together, no later than April 30, to develop and implement a classification system of OE/Ds based upon risk assessment.

January 20, 2001: George W. Bush became the forty-third President of the United States.

January 25, 2001: Former Member of Congress Norman Y. Mineta (D-CA) took the oath of office as the nation’s fourteenth Secretary of Transportation. The lone Democrat in George W. Bush’s cabinet, Mineta, age sixty-nine, had been Secretary of Commerce in the outgoing Clinton Administration, and was the first Asian Pacific American to hold this Cabinet-rank post. (See July 7, 2006.) January 2001: FAA Administrator Jane Garvey established the terminal business service. The new organizationconsolidated funding, personnel, planning, and processes in a single organization to provide integrated terminal air traffic control capabilities.

February 9, 2001: Effective this date, FAA amended the procedures for assessment and adjudication of civil penalties in space transportation. Previous regulations provided little guidance for the FAA in the prosecution of civil penalties. The new rules provided more detail on the procedures FAA must use to assess civil penalties and on the respondents' rights to adjudication. The rules also provided more detailed procedures to be used in the adjudication.

March 19, 2001: FAA announced that U.S. airlines had complied with the deadline to retrofit commercial airplanes with both fire detection and suppression systems. Most wide-body passenger airplanes already had fire detection and suppression systems in
inaccessible cargo compartments. FAA's February 1998, final rule required that the remainder of the passenger fleet be retrofitted within three years. In addition, approximately 300 all-cargo airplanes were required to have detection systems and means to shut off airflow to the cargo compartment.

April 1, 2001: Thirty-one airports were the first to be permitted to begin collecting Passenger Facility Charges (PFC) at a $4.50 level.Since that date, an additional 259 airports have collected at a $4.50 PFC level.

April 10, 2001: FAA announced its agreement with recommendations in the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) Independent Review Board (IRB) report issued earlier in the month. Chartered by the FAA, the IRB said its technical review showed that WAAS
would actually work better than the FAA had previously estimated and, when fielded, would likely provide significant additional aviation safety. The board, which met from August to December of 2000, recommended that FAA remain fully committed to the
evolution of WAAS, and concluded that national WAAS capability could be achieved with the FAA’s renewed leadership, action, and commitment. It further stated that WAAS had enormous benefits for all global positioning system (GPS) users.

April 12, 2001: FAA issued a rule, effective May 12, 2004, requiring air carrier operators to carry automated external defibrillators on large, passenger-carrying aircraft and augment currently required emergency medical kits. The new rule affected those air carrier operations for which at least one flight attendant was required and provided the option of treating serious medical events during flight time.

April 25, 2001: FAA dedicated the first version of its Weather Systems Processor (WSP) at a ceremony held at Albuquerque International Sunport, a facility that had been closely tied to development of the system. The WSP was designed to provide information to controllers and pilots about potentially hazardous microburst and wind shear weather events. The system improved the management of air traffic in air space near the airport by forecasting gust front-induced wind shifts, detecting precipitation, and tracking storms. The new processor was deployed at airports that did not qualify for the more sophisticated Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) or as interim measures at airports where TDWR was scheduled for deployment later. WSP went on line at four other sites at the same time as the Albuquerque dedication: Austin, Texas; Norfolk, Virginia; the FAA Academy (training); and the Technical Center (testing and support). )

April 27, 2001: FAA prohibited U.S. operators of Boeing 737 aircraft from running center wing tank fuel pumps unless the quantity of fuel exceeded a specified minimum level. The Airworthiness Directive was one of many FAA initiatives to enhance fuel tank safety.

May 3, 2001: FAA began providing a new service that used wireless devices to inform the public of aviation delays. Travelers with access to with pagers, cell phones, or personal digital assistants (PDA), could subscribe and obtain real-time airport status information via e-mail.

May 7, 2001: FAA issued a rule that required airplane manufacturers and operators to change how airplane fuel tanks were designed, maintained and operated. The rule included a special federal aviation regulation (SFAR) to minimize the potential for failures that could cause ignition sources in fuel tanks on new and existing airplanes. It also included a regulation that, for the first time, mandated airplane design changes to minimize the flammability of fuel tanks on new airplanes. Manufacturers had 18 months from June 6, the effective date of the rule, to conduct the safety reviews and develop required maintenance and inspection programs. Operators had 36 months from June 6 to incorporate a FAA-approved maintenance and inspection program into their operating procedures.

May 23, 2001: FAA ordered operators of DC-9/MD-88 series and MD-90-30 series aircraft to inspect the wiring of small static port heaters for chafing, loose connections, and evidence of arcing, and to make necessary repairs. These heaters keep ice from
forming on devices that measure air pressure. Operators had to determine if the surrounding insulation were covered with metalized Mylar (polyethyleneteraphthalate). If so, the Mylar had to be removed and/or replaced with Tedlar-covered insulation, or other
appropriate action had to be taken. The airworthiness directive came in response to an incident that occurred on September 17, 1999, in which a Delta Air Lines MD-88 experienced a fire in the forward cargo compartment shortly after takeoff from Northern
Kentucky International Airport in Covington, Kentucky.

May 24, 2001: FAA provided Congress a report on ways to expedite environmental reviews of runway projects, including establishing special teams of experts, reducing paperwork, and improving coordination between federal and local officials. The agency
proposed strengthening environmental impact statement (EIS) teams by adding more FAA members, asking airport proprietors to contribute members, and putting more consultants on the teams. FAA also suggested increasing FAA environmental specialist
and environmental attorney resources. FAA also planned to develop a reimbursable agreement for airports interested in paying for extra staff for expedited EIS reviews.

May 24, 2001: FAA announced it had selected a group headed by Lockheed Martin to undertake the Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures (ATOP) project. Once installed, the new ATOP technology would give controllers the ability to reduce
separation between aircraft on oceanic routes, and would give pilots greater flexibility to choose their own routes.

May 29, 2001: FAA announced it would begin using an alert warning system at the country's 34 busiest airports to help prevent runway accidents. Already in use at San Francisco and Detroit, the Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) provided air
traffic controllers with visual and aural alerts of potential runway accidents caused by runway incursions. AMASS was an enhancement to the ASDE-3 (airport surface detection equipment ) radar that processed surveillance data from the ASDE-3 and the
terminal automation system. It then determined conflicts based on the position, velocity, and acceleration of airborne arrival aircraft with ground-based aircraft and vehicles.

June 6, 2001: FAA required design approval holders of certain turbine-powered transport category airplanes, and of any subsequent modifications to those airplanes, to substantiate that the design of the fuel tank system precluded the existence of ignition sources within the airplane fuel tanks. The new rule also required the development and implementation of maintenance and inspection instructions to assure fuel tank safety. For new type designs, the manufacturer had to identify safety-critical maintenance actions and
incorporate a means either to minimize development of flammable vapors in fuel tanks or to prevent catastrophic damage if ignition did occur. These actions were based on accident investigations and adverse service experience, both of which had shown that
unforeseen failure modes and lack of specific maintenance procedures on certain airplane fuel tank systems might result in degradation of design safety features intended to preclude ignition of vapors within the fuel tank.

June 7, 2001: FAA unveiled a plan that addressed the growing gap between demand and capacity in the air transportation system. The plan integrated and aligned agency activities with those of the aviation industry and users of the system. The Operational
Evolution Plan (OEP) focused on maintaining safety, increasing capacity, and managing delays. The plan identified specific tasks to be accomplished in the near-term (2001 and 2002), mid-term (2002 to 2004), and long-term (2005 to 2010). FAA and industry
considered the OEP an evolving document that would be modified, particularly to incorporate new technologies as they emerged.

June 11, 2001: FAA awarded a $125 million dollar contract to Lockheed Martin Corp., to develop and field the En Route Communications Gateway (ECG). This new gateway for processing radar data would reduce system outages and thereby both increase safety margins and reduce maintenance requirements. ECG would replace the Peripheral Adapter Module Replacement Item (PAMRI) program. The system would be installed at twenty-one air route traffic control centers, the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City, and the William J. Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The Seattle Air Route Traffic Control Center was the first site scheduled for installation of the new system. FAA expected the system to become operational in the summer of 2003. The last site would be fielded in mid-2005.

June 25, 2001: FAA issued a final rule to protect from disclosure voluntarily provided information that aids the agency in improving safety and security. The rule particularly encouraged data sharing programs, such as Flight Operational Quality Assurance, which
used state-of-the-art flight data recorder technology to collect and analyze data on routine flights. FAA had been using data collected in this fashion to identify industry-wide safety trends and to target more effectively resources and correct potential safety problems. The rule took effect on July 25.

June 30, 2001: Mayor Richard Daley announced his proposal for reducing delays and congestion at O’Hare International Airport. Highlights of the proposal included the addition of one new runway and the relocation of three of the current seven runways.
According to the city’s estimates, making these changes would reduce delays related to poor weather by 95 percent and overall delays by 79 percent.

July 11, 2001: In a report to Congress, FAA's new Management Advisory Council (MAC) concluded that the agency's rulemaking process was inefficient, lacked credibility, and unless fixed, would erode the safety, security, and efficiency of the aviation system. The MAC, however, was only one of a number of groups that had recently faulted FAA's rulemaking process. GAO, the Aeronautical Repair Station Association, and organized labor echoed the MAC's findings. The MAC found that FAA took an average of five years to complete rules, and, at its current pace, would not be able to finish all of the rules currently being developed for 15 years. It also criticized FAA's cost/benefit analyses, inadequate staffing and management accountability within FAA, and inefficiencies in the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee process.

July 17, 2001: FAA released final rules on airport and aircraft security, as recommended by the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security following the 1996 crash of TWA 800.

July 31, 2001: FAA awarded a contract to ITT Industries Aerospace/Communications Division, of Ft. Wayne, Indiana, to provide the agency with multi-mode VHF digital air- to-ground radios. The contract was for an initial $20.5 million and would be worth as
much as $580 million if all options were exercised. ITT Industries partnered with Park Air Systems, Federal Data Corp., and Operational Technologies Services, Inc., to provide the equipment. This first building block of the Next Generation Air/Ground
Communications (NEXCOM) system would, in phases, replace air traffic controllers' aging analog radios with digital radios. When completed, the entirely digital system would enhance the FAA's ability to meet expanding air traffic control communication demands.

August 14, 2001: Representative John Mica (R-FL), chairman of the House aviation subcommittee, criticized FAA for delaying deployment of the airport movement area safety system (AMASS). Mica said the program was six years behind schedule.

August 16, 2001: FAA unveiled a new initiative designed to enhance the continued safety of aircraft wiring systems from their design and installation through their retirement. FAA based its Enhanced Airworthiness Program for Airplane Systems (EAPAS) on results from an intensive data-gathering effort on aircraft wiring systems done in cooperation with industry. EAPAS combined a variety of near- and longer-term actions into a plan to increase awareness of wiring system degradation, implement improved procedures for wiring maintenance and design, and spread that information throughout the aviation community. FAA's overall aging transport non-structural systems program, an effort begun in October 1998, was an expansion of the agency's aging aircraft program.

August 20, 2001: A final FAA rule, effective this date, lowered the overflight fees the agency charged carriers for air traffic and related services incurred by certain aircraft that transit U.S.-controlled airspace but neither take off from, nor land in, the United States. The new rule reduced the fees that had been established by an interim final rule that had gone into effect on August 1, 2000, and allowed FAA to continue to charge fees as required by law. FAA rulemaking efforts to impose statutorily required fees had been
repeatedly challenged in court. The most recent challenge had stemmed from an opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, issued on July 13, 2001, which stated: "Because FAA has failed to articulate the basis for its conclusions that ‘the unit costs of providing [air traffic control] services to overflights within each environment [are] identical to the unit costs of providing [air traffic control] services to all air traffic within each environment,’ we vacate the 2000 Rule and remand to the FAA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.''

September 11, 2001: Nineteen radical Islamic extremists with the group al Qaeda penetrated security at three major airports, seized four U.S. domestic airliners, and turned them into missiles that destroyed the World Trade Center in New York City, and damaged the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, killing thousands. Passengers on one of the planes fought the hijackers causing the plane to crash in a Pennsylvania field, killing all on board. For the first time in history, FAA put a ground stop on all U.S. air traffic. Related details follow: Eastern Standard Time
• 7:59 a.m.: American Airlines Flight 11, a Boeing 767 with 92 people on board, takes off from Boston Logan airport for Los Angeles.
• 8:14 a.m.: United Air Lines Flight 175, a Boeing 767 with 65 people on board, takes off from Boston Logan airport for Los Angeles.
• 8:20 a.m.: American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757 with 64 people on board, takes off from Washington Dulles airport for Los Angeles.
• 8:38 a.m.: FAA notifies the North American Aerospace Defense Command’s (NORAD) Northeast Air Defense Sector about the suspected hijacking of American Flight 11.
• 8:42 a.m.: United Air Lines Flight 93, a Boeing 757 with 44 people on board, takes off from Newark airport for San Francisco.
• 8:46 a.m.: American Flight 11 crashes into the north tower of the World Trade Center.
• 9:03 a.m. (approx.): United Flight 175 crashes into the south tower of the World Trade Center.
• 9:04 a.m.: FAA's Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center stops all departures from airports in its jurisdiction (New England and eastern New York State).
• 9:06 a.m.: FAA bans takeoffs of all flights bound to or through the airspace of New York Center from airports in that air route traffic control center and the three adjacent air route traffic control centers – Boston, Cleveland and Washington. This is referred
to as a first tier ground stop and covers the Northeast from North Carolina north and as far west as eastern Michigan.
• 9:08 a.m.: FAA bans all takeoffs nationwide for flights going to or through New York Center airspace.
• 9:15 a.m.: FAA (New York Center) notifies NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector that United Airlines 175 was the second aircraft that crashed into the World Trade Center.
• 9:25 a.m.: FAA bans takeoffs of all civilian aircraft regardless of destination – a national ground stop.
• 9:37 a.m.: American Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon.
• 9:45 a.m.: In the first unplanned shutdown of U. S. airspace, FAA orders all aircraft to land at the nearest airport as soon as practical. At this time, there were more than
4,500 aircraft in the air on instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plans. • 10:03 a.m.: United Flight 93 crashes in Stony Creek Township, Pennsylvania.
• 10:39 a.m.: Reaffirming the earlier order, FAA issues a notice to airmen (NOTAM) that halts takeoffs and landings at all airports.
• 12:15 p.m.: The airspace over the 48 contiguous states is clear of all commercial and private flights.
• 2:30 p.m.: FAA announces there will be no U.S. air traffic until noon Eastern Standard Time Wednesday at the earliest.

September 12, 2001: Department of Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta announced FAA would allow a limited reopening of the nation’s commercial airspace system to allow flights diverted the day before to continue to their original destinations. The
Secretary announced FAA was temporarily extending the ground stop order imposed the previous day, while it initiated additional security measures. Mineta said FAA would permit flights only in special limited circumstances. Flights diverted as a result of yesterday’s ground stop would be allowed to continue to their original destination under vastly tightened security guidelines. Only passengers on the original flights would be allowed to re-board, and only after airports and airlines had implemented strict screening
measures. Mineta said a variety of stepped-up security measures would be instituted at the airports once they re-opened. Those measures included: • A thorough search and security check of all airplanes and airports before passengers were allowed to enter and board aircraft. • Discontinuance of curbside check-in at the airport. • Discontinuance of off-airport check-in. • Only ticketed passengers would be allowed to proceed past airport screeners to catch their flights. • Vehicles near airport terminals would be monitored more closely.

September 14, 2001: Department of Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta approved restoration of the next phase of national air service, allowing certain general aviation flights back into the air effective at 4:00 p.m. General aviation was allowed to resume flights operating under Instrument Flight Rules, or IFR. Temporarily, however, general aviation flights would not be allowed to fly within 25 nautical miles of New York City and Washington, DC. Those restrictions would be kept in place until further notice as officials continued to assess the recovery situation in those cities over the near term. September 19, FAA lifted most restrictions of general aviation (Part 91) visual flight rules operations, or VFR, flights. VFR flights were now permitted for U.S. registered aircraft outside of enhanced Class B airspace, or airspace within a 30-mile radius of 30 major U.S. airports. FAA kept restrictions on the following flying activities (except in Hawaii): civil aircraft VFR flight training operations; VFR operations for banner towing; news reporting; traffic watch; airship/blimps; and Part 91 sightseeing. AA also restricted flying of any kind within 3000 feet altitude and three nautical miles of major sporting events or large open-air gatherings of people, such as football and baseball stadiums, race tracks, and concerts.

September 23, 2001: As a result of national security concerns, FAA, in conjunction with other federal agencies, issued a notice to airmen (NOTAM) banning Part 137 (agricultural/crop-duster flights) from operating. In addition, no aircraft capable of or equipped for agriculture operations could operate during the ban.

September 27, 2001: In a speech at Chicago’s O’Hare airport, President Bush announced three measures to enhance aviation safety and security. First, he would continue to expand the air marshal program and seek Congressional approval to make this expansion
permanent. Second, he would ensure that, effective October 1, a fund of $500 million would be established to finance aircraft modifications to delay or deny access to the cockpit. Thirdly, he would work with Congress to put the Federal Government in charge
of airport security and screening services. The president said that fully implementing the extensive security proposal might take four to six months. Meantime, to ensure that every airport has a strong security presence, he asked the governors of all 50 states to call up
the National Guard – at the Federal Government’s expense – to augment existing security staff at every commercial airportnationwide. FAA would provide the necessary training for the National Guard personnel.

September 27, 2001: FAA announced it was launching a nationwide search for personnel to join the air marshal program. FAA was training agents from other federal agencies, including the Customs Service, the Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Already-experienced law enforcement officials were being schooled on handling warfare in a confined space aboard a jet.

September 28, 2001: FAA alerted civilian pilots of their responsibility to avoid restricted airspace and the procedures to follow if intercepted, in light of a Department of Defense announcement that pilots near or in restricted or prohibited airspace faced a forced
landing, or as a last resort, use of deadly force by military aircraft. New security decisions required that additional airspace be barred to civilian aircraft. FAA anticipated announcing new restricted and prohibited areas throughout the United States. This additional airspace would be over areas that require protection for national security reasons. New and current restricted and prohibited areas would be revised periodically.

September 28, 2001: FAA announced it was seeking industry input on its new En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) program, which would replace the existing en route air traffic control automation system and selected en route infrastructure. FAA planned to pursue the award of a single ERAM System contract. Services to be provided under the contract included system engineering, system integration, system requirements analysis, system design/development, software design/development, system testing, infrastructure upgrades/enhancements, hardware and software replacements, system deployment, transition planning and support, training, maintenance, logistics support and life cycle support. FAA planned to incorporate any industry comments it deemed appropriate in the development of the final ERAM screening information request (SIR) #1 contract bid package planned for release in mid-October 2001.

October 4, 2001: Reagan National Airport reopened for business, but under very tight security. Passengers had to undergo intense security screening and were limited to one carry-on bag and one personal item (a purse or briefcase). The first phase of the reopening included commercial flights by six airlines to the airports in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago O’Hare, Dallas/Ft. Worth, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, New York (LaGuardia), and Newark. The six carriers were United, American, Delta, US Airways, Northwest, and
Continental.

October 13, 2001: Joint teams comprised of officials from FAA and Department of Transportation Inspector General began auditing background checks of Argenbright Security, Inc., employees at 13 U.S. airports. Recent FAA audits of Argenbright found
background check violations at these airports. The action followed a petition filed by Assistant U.S. Attorney John Pease on Thursday, October 11, with the U.S. District Court in Philadelphia that ordered Argenbright officials to answer charges that they continued to violate a probation agreement regarding the hiring of screeners without first performing appropriate background checks or providing training. In the following weeks, separate FAA teams began auditing background checks of all U.S. airport security
screeners, starting with those employed at the nation's 20 largest airports. The initial 13 airports were: Boston Logan International, Port Columbus International (Columbus, Ohio), Eastern Iowa (Cedar Rapids, Iowa), Dallas/Fort Worth International, Detroit
Metro Wayne County, Las Vegas McCarran International, Los Angeles International, Nashville International, New York LaGuardia, Phoenix Sky Harbor International, Seattle- Tacoma International, Trenton-Mercer and Washington Dulles International. Future
background checks would be audited to make sure screeners were properly hired according to FAA standards.

October 18, 2001: Department of Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta announced that beginning the following Friday, October 26, flights at Reagan National Airport would be expanded to include 18 more cities, bringing to 26 the number of cities served by the airport after the president authorized its reopening.

October 23, 2001: The National Transportation Safety Board issued its findings on the crash of an American Airlines MD-82 during landing at Little Rock airport in 1999. The Board determined the probable cause of the accident was the flight crew's failure to
discontinue the approach when severe thunderstorms and their associated hazards to flight operations had moved into the airport area, and the flight crew's failure to ensure that the spoilers had extended after touchdown. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew's impaired performance resulting from fatigue and the situational stress associated with the intent to land under the circumstances, continuation of the approach to a landing when the airline company's maximum crosswind component was exceeded, and use of reverse thrust greater than 1.3 engine pressure ratio after landing. The accident occurred on June 1, 1999, as the flight was arriving from Dallas/Fort Worth with 139 passengers and six crewmembers on board. The aircraft overran the runway, passed through a chain link fence, went down an embankment and collided with a structure supporting the runway lighting system. The captain and 10 passengers were killed; over 100 others were injured. As a result of the investigation, the Board made 22 new recommendations to FAA and two to the National Weather Service.

October 30, 2001: FAA issued a rule that protected the data collected under airline FOQA programs from FAA enforcement action, except in criminal or deliberate cases. A FAA rule issued on June 25 protected voluntarily provided information from disclosure to encourage data-sharing programs such as Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA). The rule responded to a mandate from Congress to protect information that aided in improving safety and security. It also responded to recommendations made by
the 1997 National Civil Aviation Review Commission, chaired by Norman Mineta. November 30, effective this date, FAA codified enforcement protection for FOQA programs. The agency would not use an operator's FOQA data, or even aggregate FOQA
data, in any enforcement action against the operator or its employees when the information was obtained from an FOQA program approved by the Administrator. Criminal or deliberate acts would not be protected by this ruling. The rule required air
carriers participating in approved FOQA programs to submit aggregated FOQA data to the FAA for use in monitoring safety trends.

November 12, 2001: American Airlines Flight 587 exploded over Queens, New York shortly taking off from John F. Kennedy International Airport. All 260 people aboard the plane and five people on the ground were killed. Some witnesses reported that a burning engine fell from the sky before the aircraft did, and others described a midair explosion. The wreckage fell in three places. One cylindrical piece, resembling an engine housing, fell onto a Texaco station, where it landed six feet from the fuel pumps. Most of the fuselage cratered into an intersection, sending columns of dense black smoke aloft over leaping flames. The third element, a wing section, plunged into Jamaica Bay.

November 13, 2001: FAA published a proposal to mandate installation of a new, improved rudder control system in all Boeing 737 models within five years. The proposed airworthiness directive would require Boeing 737 operators to install a new rudder system, currently being developed by Boeing, and make any additional changes to the aircraft needed to accommodate the new system, within five years of the AD effective date. The new design would increase the overall safety of the 737 by simplifying the rudder system and eliminating a range of previously known failure possibilities. The redesign also would make it unnecessary to have existing flight crew operating procedures and associated training unique to the 737 rudder system. (See October 26, 2000; October 7, 2002.)
November 14, 2001: FAA commissioned the last Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS) at New Haven, Connecticut, five months ahead of schedule, marking the completion of a nationwide push to establish 569 baseline systems, which started in
November 1993 in Montrose, Colorado. ASOS provided current weather information on critical weather parameters, such as sky condition and visibility, temperature and dew point, pressure, wind speed, and direction. It also identified precipitation and its
accumulation, thunderstorm reporting, and freezing rain accumulation.

November 15, 2001: FAA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration made a new tool available to convey advanced storm information to pilots. The National Convective Weather Forecast (NCWF) product, designed and developed by the National
Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, Colorado, and MIT Lincoln Laboratory, in Lexington, Massachusetts, provided pilots with a plotted map depicting the current location of convective hazards and where they would be an hour later. Pilots, federal aviation weather briefers, air traffic control specialists, and airline dispatchers who routinely made operational decisions associated with thunderstorm hazards routinely were turning to the NCWF for essential information.

November 16, 2001: FAA issued an emergency airworthiness directive mandating an inspection of the vertical stabilizers and rudders on all Airbus A-300 and A-310 aircraft. The inspections had to be completed within 15 days. In addition to the area where the
structural failure in American 587 occurred, the inspections also were focused on the surrounding rudder components and attachment fittings.

November 19, 2001: President George W. Bush signed into law the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Public Law 107-71), which, among other things, called for the establishment of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in the Department
of Transportation, to be responsible for security at airports. The act also broadened AIP eligibility to include costs for additional security-related activity required by law or the Secretary of Transportation. The period of eligibility for such projects was for FY 2002 and could include only those additional costs incurred from September 11, 2001, to September 30, 2002. February 13, 2002, TSA took over responsibility for aviation security from FAA.

December 6, 2001: FAA required each airport operator and aircraft operator with a security program under part 107 or part 108, to conduct fingerprint-based criminal history record checks for individuals who had not already undergone such a check. The rule
applied to those who either possess, or have applied for: unescorted access authority to the security identification display area of an airport; authority to authorize others to have unescorted access; and screening functions.

December 10, 2001: FAA amended the list of airspace locations where Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM) could be applied to include the New York flight information region (FIR) portion of West Atlantic Route System airspace. RVSM procedures allowed vertical separation to be reduced between aircraft at certain higher altitudes if the aircraft met stringent altimeter and auto-pilot performance requirements. The rule also required any aircraft equipped with the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, version II (TCAS II) flying in RVSM airspace to incorporate a version of TCAS II compatible with RVSM operations.

December 11, 2001: Runway 4L/22R opened at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport.

December 20, 2001: FAA decreased the no fly zone around Reagan National Airport. As a result of the change, Suburban Airport in Anne Arundel County, Freeway Airport in Prince George's County and Maryland Airport in Charles County, Maryland reopened for
normal operations.

December 27, 2001: Four FAA facilities in the Eastern Region – the New York TRACON, the New York, and Washington AirRoute Traffic Control Centers, and the Philadelphia tower – implemented what was called the “Newark Chokepoint Flip/Flop”
project. This involved switching flight paths and eliminating a crossover pattern affecting hundreds of aircraft daily to increase capacity.

December 2001: The Kansas City Air Route Traffic Control Center began daily use of the User Request Evaluation Tool (URET). The tool enabled controllers to see traffic 20 minutes into the future and allowed them to safely assign and grant pilot requests for
more direct and more fuel efficient routes. The prototypes at the Memphis and Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Centers had been shown to save the airlines $1.5 million per month based on an increase in direct routings of about 20 percent.